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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH IN UNAUTHORIZED

In the cases involving autopsies which are unauthorized, consent for their performance not having been obtained prior to
their execution, the courts are fairly well committed to the proposition
that a cause of action to recover for the mental anguish caused by the
autopsy exists in favor of some person closely connected to. the deceased.1 However, the grounds upon which this recovery has been
based are varied, and not altogether consistent; and it is the purpose
of this comment to discuss these several grounds and to attempt an
evaluation of them, in the hope of arriving at some conclusion as to
the proper basis of such recovery. In order to restrict the discussion,
no mention will be made herein of the difficult and, as yet, inadequately
answered problem concerning the person to whom this cause of action
accrues.2 It will be assumed that the deceased was a male who died
AUTOPSY CAsEs -

1 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891). In WEINMANN, A
SURVEY OF THE LAW CONCERNING DEAD BODIES (1929) (National Research Council
Bull., No. 73), are discussed various statutory limitations on performing autopsies.
These statutes have been passed in order to prevent autopsies by incompetent practictioners and to allow those surviving the deceased to express their consent to the
performance of the autopsy.
2 WEINMANN, A SURVEY OF THE LAW CONCERNING DEAD BODIES 21-22 (1929)
(Nati6nal Research Council Bull., No. 73); Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102
N. W. 40 (1905); J\1agruder, "Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of
Torts," 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 at 1065 (1936); IO ALBANY L. J. 70 (1874);
19 CoRN. L. Q. 108 (1933).
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leaving a surviving spouse, and that she is the person entitled to any
and all relief available under any of the several grounds of recovery to
be discussed.
As a general rule a plaintiff may not recover for mental anguish,
unaccompanied by physical injury, unless it results from a wilful or
malicious wrong by the defendant. 8 It was on the basis of finding such
a wilful or malicious wrong that recovery for mental anguish has been
allowed in cases involving such independent torts as assault, battery,
seduction, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The feature
of the unauthorized autopsy cases which distinguishes them from such
cases is that the act of the defendant is not directed toward the plaintiff,
rather is it directed toward the body of the deceased.
In England, soon after the Norman Conquest ( rn66) the church
took over jurisdiction in regard to the place of burial and the sepulture
of the dead.4 So complete was its jurisdiction over dead bodies that the
common-law courts of England continually refused to recognize that
they had any jurisdiction whatsoever; 5 and as a result, there are very
few early common-law cases which can be turned to for assistance in
this field. However, as the judicial system of the United States developed, there was a steadfast refusal to adopt, as part of our law, ,the
precedents of the ecclesiastical courts. Thus, for the first time, temporal
courts assumed jurisdiction of dead bodies and the protection of the
rights of the living in their dead. 6
In reaching the conclusion that' the surviving spouse has some interest in the dead body of her husband which must be protected against
wilful invasion, at least three grounds have been presented as the basis
for this protection: (I) that the surviving spouse has a property right,
or at least a quasi-property right, in the dead body; ( 2) that there is
a relational interest between the deceased and his surviving spouse; or
(3) that the surviving spouse has a right to possession of the dead body
8 Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort," 37 M1cH.
L. REv. 874 at 879 (1939); Curtin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 App. Div. 253, 42
N. Y. S. 1109 (1897).
4 33 LAW NoTES 225 (1930). Kuzenski, "Property in Dead Bodies," 9 MARQ.
L. REv. 17 at 18 (1924), has given three reasons for the church taking jurisdiction
here: (1) the church was best prepared to prevent sacrilege to the dead body; (2) the
church owned the burial grounds; and (3) the .church had original probate jurisdiction
after death.
5 Blackstone, the eminent English jurist and common law advocate, once said:
"But, though the heir has a property in the monuments and escutcheons of his ancestors, yet he has none in their bodies or ashes; nor can he bring any civil action against
such as indecently, at least if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains when dead
and buried." 2 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 429 (1756).
6 An excellent discussion of the historical background of this field of law may be
found in Matter of the Widening of Beekman Street, 4 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 503
(1857).
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in the condition in which it existed at the time of death for the purpose
of burial.
I.

Ecclesiastical courts having assumed complete jurisdiction over dead
bodies, the English common-law courts refused to admit that there
could be any property rights in a corpse. 7 Moreover, it was considered
impractical to talk about property rights in dead bodies when none of
the incidents of ownership attached thereto. 8 However, when the
colonial courts refused to follow the ecclesiastical precedents, some of
them felt that in order to protect fully all possible interests involved
it would be advisable to speak of the interests in dead bodies as "property rights"; 9 and several jurisdictions in the United States have decided such cases on this the0ry. The leading case on this subject is
Larson v. Chase,1° where the court in allowing recovery by the surviving spouse for mental anguish says:
" ...• Indeed, the mere fact that a person has exclusive rights
over a body for the purposes of burial leads necessarily to the
conclusion that it is his property in the broadest and most general
sense of that term, viz., something over which the law accords him
exclusive control." 11
Going even further than merely stating that the surviving spouse
has a property right in the dead body, at least two courts have held that
the custody of the body is a "trust" for friends and others feeling a_
natural interest toward the deceased.12 Because of its technical connotation in the law of property, the use of the word "trust" in this connection is indeed unfortunate. One writer explains its meaning to be
7 Undoubtedly the doctrine that a corpse cannot be cop.sidered property originated
in the dictum of Lord Coke in 3 INSTITUTES 203 (1644), where, in asserting the
authority of the church, he says: "The burial of the cadaver (that is caro data r1ermibu;
[flesh given to the worms]) is nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclesiastical cognizance."
This brief statement asserts that the burial is nullius in bonis, but it does not assert that
an individual can have no legal interest ih the body as property. As a result of this
statement by Coke, in Haynes Case, 12 Coke II3, 77 Eng. Rep. 1389 (1614), it was
declared to be larceny to take the winding sheet from a dead body; but in Regina v.
Handyside, 2 EAST, PLEAS OF nrn CRoWN, 652 (1806), not larceny to steal the body
itself.
8 WEINMANN, A SURVEY OF THE LAW CONCERNING DEAD BODIES 21 (1929)
(National Research Council Bull., No. 73).
9 Kuzenski, "Property in Dc,ad Bodies," 9 MARQ. L. REv. l 7 ( l 924) ; 12 VA.
L. REV. 75 (1925); 18 MINN. L. REV. 204 (1933).
10 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 {1891).
.
11 Id., 47 Minn. at 310. Because. the courts have recognized this exclusive right
to possession of the body for burial for so many years, the reasoning in this quotation
is not circular as it would otherwise appear to be.
12 Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422 (1881); Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery,
IO R. I. 227 (1872).
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that the courts will protect the repose of the dead after burial, and
before burial the conflicting rights of all those interested will be subject ,
to the rules of public health and decency and to considerations of fitness
and respect. 18
This ground for recovery has not gained much support in the later
cases. The courts which do employ it feel that the situation calls for a
recovery by the surviving spouse; but being hard put to find a suitable
basis for recovery, they rely upon a "well established ground" and state
that henceforth the surviving spouse shall be deemed to have a "property right" in the body of her deceased husband.
Many courts, realizing that this so-called "property right" is something evolved out of thin air, have refused_to go quite this far in order
to give recovery. However, they too feel that recovery should be accorded the surviving spouse, and they speak in terms of a "quasi-property right." 14 Such- courts speak of the "most tender affections of the
human heart (which] cluster about the bodies of one's loved ones," 15 "a
kind of property interest in the dead body," 16 and "a subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many
matters of actual property." 11 It appears that the courts are merely
searching for a convenient "peg'' upon which to hang the "cloak" of
recovery. Some courts expressly reject the theory of a property right in
the dead body of the deceased.18
2.

In their constant search for means of accomplishing justice without
doing excessive violence to the facts or to established precedents, a few
courts have preferred to talk in terms of "relational interest with the,
deceased'? in order to give the surviving spouse recovery for her mental
anguish.10 In Fox v. Gordon,2° the court says:
"Questions which relate to the custody and disposal of the
the remains of the dead do not depend upon the principles which
18 Grinnell, "Legal Rights in the Remains of the Dead," 17 GREEN BAG 345 at
349 (1905).
14 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 51 S. E. 24 (1905); Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., II7 N. J. L. 90, 186 A. 585 (1936); Burney v. Children's
Hospital, 169 Mass. 57, 47 N. E. 401 (1897). See also 33 LAw NOTES 225 (1930)
and 28 MxcH. L. REV. 353 (1930).
15 Wall v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 184 Mo. App. 127 at 132, 168 S. 'w. 257
(1914).
16 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Wilson, 123 Ga. 62 at 67, 51 S. E. 24 (1905).
17 Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, IO R. I. 227 at 237-238 (1872).
18 Palenzke v. Bruning, 98 Ill. App. 644 (1901); Fox v. Gordon, 16 Phila. (Pa.)
185 (1883).
19 Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 55_1, 37 N. Y. S. 471 (1896); Koerber v.
Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905); Fox v. Gordon, 16 Phila. (Pa.) 185
(1883).
20 16 Phila. (Pa.) 185 (1883).
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regulate the possession and ownership of property, but upon considerations arising partly out of domestic relations, the duties and
obligations which spring from family relationship and ties of
blood ... as growing out of the natural relations of human beings to each other and the divine and human laws which bind
society together." 21
In Foley v. Phelps,22 a case of first impression in New York, the
court did not put the right to recover upon the property right theory,
but rather on an invasion of the clearly established legal right to perform the duty of burial-a duty which the law requires someone to
perform, and which was bestowed upon the surviving spouse by reason
of her relationship with the deceased. Although the Foley case is gen·erally cited under the "possession of the dead body" theory of recovery,
there is the reference stated above to the relational interest doctrine.
Dean Leon Green 23 has written a series of articles on "Relational
Interests" 24 and devotes some little space to a consideration of their
application to dead bodies.25 He speaks of the relationship between the
living and the dead as one "as real as between living members of the
family . . . one of the dearest and most valued interests known to
human beings." 26 Dean Green's contention is that the proper basis for
recovery in these cases is not that the surviving spouse's personality or
property interest has been invaded, but that the defendant in acting
wrongfully toward the body of the deceased has harmed the relation
between the surviving spouse and the deceased. As a result, he feels
that there should be recovery for the injury to this relational interest,
and in order to punish the defendant for his inconsiderate conduct.27
There has been some criticism of this "relational interest" doctrine,28
and some courts have refuse\i to admit its validity. 29 It is, however, an
ingenious method by which the courts are able to give recovery to the
surviving spouse in the unauthorized autopsy cases without having to
justify a use of the property analogy.

3.
Perhaps the most sensible and undoubtedly the most generally
accepted ground for recovery in these unauthorized autopsy cases is that
Id., 16 Phila. 185 at 185-186.
l App. Div. 551, 37 N. Y. S. 471 (1896).
23 Dean and Pro'essor of Law at Northwestern University.
24 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 1041 (1934-1935).
25 Jd. 485.
2s 1d.
27 Id. 487.
28 Magruder, "Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts," 49
HARV. L. REv. 1033 at 1066 (1936).
29 Buchanan v. Buchanan, 28 Misc. 261, 59 N. Y. $. 810 (1899) (no person has
a legal right to the possession of a corpse because of relationship in the abstract).
21
22
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the surviving spouse has for the purpose of burial the right to possession
of the dead body in the condition in which it existed at death. 30 Some
courts have talked of this as the "duty" of burial, which authorizes and
requires the surviving spouse to take possession of the body and see that
it is given proper burial, thereby becoming closely allied to the "relational interest" ground of recovery. 81 This interest of the living in the
bodies of their dead has been accepted from generation to generation,
and as one judge so ably states:
" ... The burial of the dead is a subject which interests the
feelings of mankind to a much greater degree than many matters
of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the universal
feelings of mankind to be discharged by someone toward the dead;
. a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect from violation; and
a duty on the part of others to abstain from violation...." 82

In Foley v. Phelps,3 8 the court held that this right of possession for
the purpose of burial is "the right to what remains when the breath
leaves the body, and not merely to such a hacked, hewed, and mutilated corpse as some stranger, an offender against the criminal law,
may choose to turn over to an afflicted relative."
Some courts have combined this ground for recovery with that of
a "property right in the dead body." Larson v. Chase 84 is an excellent
example of this approach, as is Pettigrew v. Pettigrew. 85 It is difficult
to determine just which of the two grounds was the basis upon which
the courts· decided those cases, for each is discussed fully in both opinions.
It is suggested that perhaps the "right of possession" doctrine will
require less mental gymnastics in the attempt to justify its conclusion,
for the "right to possession for burial" doctrine has been accepted for
generations and is not based upon the same amount of fiction involved
in the "property right" theory.
80
Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891); Streipe v. Liberty
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 243 Ky. 15, 47 S. W. (2d) 1004 (1932); McPosey v. Sisters of
the S9rrowful Mother, 177 Okla. 52, 57 P. (2d) 617 (1936); Darcy v. Presbyterian
Hospital, 202 N. Y. 259, 95 N. E. 695 (1912); Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551,
37 N. Y. S. 471 (1896); Hasselbach v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, 173 App. Div. 89, 159
N. Y. S. 376 (1916). See also 28 M1cH. L. REv. 353 (1930).
81
Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 37 N. Y. S. 471 (1896); Fox v. Gordon,
16 Phila. (Pa.) 185 (1883).
82
Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, IO R. I. 227 at 237-238 (1872), quoted in
Burney v. Children's Hospital, 169 Mass. 57 at 59, 47 N. E. 401 (1897).
38
1 App. Div. 551 at 555, 37 N. Y. S. 471 (1896).
84
47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891).
85
207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (1904).
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4.
Perhaps the closest analogy that can be drawn to the unauthorized
autopsy cases is in that group of cases in which a telegraph company
fails to deliver a death message in time to allow a near relative to attend the funeral of the deceased. 86 In these cases, recovery has generally been allowed for mental anguish suffered as a result of the company's failure properly to carry out its agency. This recovery has been
based on tort liability, breach of contract, or the violation of a public
duty owed by the telegraph company.87 Dean Green feels that recovery
could and logically. should be based on an invasion of a relational
interest.88 Probably the real basis of recovery is that the company
should realize the relative importance of the message both to the sender
and to the receiver; and consequently the courts have seen fit to impose
a higher standard of care on the telegraph company to be sure that such
messages are handled properly. Messages containing news that someone
dear to the receiver has passed away become of great importance to the
receiver, and he may easily suffer mental anguish because he was not
informed in time to attend the funeral. The courts feel that society
should protect the rights of its members in paying their last respee+s to
a beloved one who has died, and so it is that they allow compensation
for mental anguish caused by the failure of the telegraph company to
deliv:er the message in time.
Another analogy that can be drawn to the unauthorized autopsy
cases is in that group of cases involving consent before a surgical operation is performed.89 The courts have concluded that society will be
protected more fully if the person who is to undergo the operation
consents before its performance; or if he is not able to give the required consent;that someone responsible for and to him do so.40 In the
unauthorized autopsy cases, the deceased Cq.nnot give the consent necessary to authorize the autopsy, so the courts allow the surviving spouse
to have that right. It is surely no hardship upon the one who is going
86 See .collection of cases in 7 N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REv. 772 (1930). Enough
cases of this type have occurred in Texas to give that state's name to the doctrine which
allows recovery on such fact situations. The leading case in the United States is
SoRelle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
87 Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N. W. I (1895);
SoRelle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881); Western Union T.el. Co.
v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930).
.
88 Green, "Relational Interests," 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 at 487 (1934).
89 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12 (1905); Hively v. Higgs,
'120 Ore. 588, 253 P. 363 (1927); Markart v. Zeimer, 67 Cal. App. 363, 227 P.
683 (1924); Relater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
40 Moss v. Rishworth, (Tex. Comm. App. 1920) 222
W. 225; Pratt v. Davis,
224 Ill. 300, 79 N. E. 562 (1906); Zoski v; Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N. W. 99
( 1935).
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to perform the autopsy to· require that he gain consent from the surviving spouse, and once he has gained this consent he may perform the
autopsy without fear of being liable to her for mental anguish ca'Qsed
by the act.
In conclusion, several observations may be made. First, at least
two of the grounds for recovery-property right in the dead body and
relational interests therein-require the courts to employ questionable
~oncepts in order to allow recovery. Secondly, it would appear to the
author that the courts could save themselves much effort and yet arrive
at the same result by a very simple and direct method-by stating that
the cause of action to recover for mental anguish is based upon an intentional act of the defendant which will probably cause acute and
poignant emotional distress.41 The act is done at a time when the emotions of the surviving spouse are strained to the breaking point, during
a period when she should be protected and not presented with the
thought that the body of her husband has been dissected before burial
without her consent. She is in such a mental condition that anything
out of the ordinary which might be done to the body may easily cause
mental anguish; and when the defendant fails to obtain her consent
before the autopsy, the courts should find that the defendant may be
deemed to have intended the result that followed--so closely connected is it.
As the three grounds discussed above have resulted in allowing
recovery to the surviving spouse, their applications cannot be condemned. Society as a whole will probably not suffer too greatly if the
consent of the surviving spouse must be obtaineci before the autopsy
may be performed. However, the real basis for recovery in these
autopsy cases is that the surviving spouse has suffered mental anguish
as the result of an intentional act of the defendant from which the
result might have been anticipated by him; and as a result) he should
be penalized for his misconduct. The. main objection to the three
grounds discussed is th;it they employ a roundabout method of arriving at an apparently correct.result, and that defect could be alleviated
by employing the simple method stated above.
Brooks F. Crabtree
u Harper and McNeeley, "A Re-examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress," 1938 Wis. L. REv. 42q. The word "intentional" is used in the sense
that the defendant actually intends to do the act in question-to perform the autopsy.

